Nuclear plants emit virtually no greenhouse gases over their full life-cycle. Consequently, continued operation of existing nuclear plants is recognized as essential to meeting even the modest greenhouse gas reduction targets of the Kyoto Accord. However, much expanded nuclear deployment will be needed as developing economies aggressively grow GDP with its associated growth in electrical power.
INTRODUCTION
The IPCC has developed a series of scenarios on how the world's energy consumption may change over the next century. We have recalculated these scenarios to determine the required penetration of non-carbon sources to stabilize emissions, and what is required for the relative contributions of renewables, nuclear energy, and hydrogen fuel substitution in transportation. In the IPCC's scenarios, a large rise in energy use in the developing and newly-industrialized countries, like China, raises total world energy consumption a factor of two by 2040. As the IPCC scenarios recognize, it is not legitimate simply to project the existing world pattern forward to the middle of the 21 st Century. Clearly there is a need for greater substitution of carbon-based fuels in meeting the expansion of energy demand in the developing world. Recognizing the present and future problems of increased oil demand, regional locations of major suppliers, reduced supply amounts, greenhouse gas issues (of which transportation is a major part), and rising fuel prices, almost all major automobile manufacturers are pursuing research on alternate fuels. In addition, users of carbon fuel as natural gas for hydrogen production in the hydrocarbon, petrochemical and plastics industries are seeking alternate sources before high natural gas prices and reduced supply lead to excessive manufacturing costs.
The Context of the Global Environment
As Figure 1 shows, the carbon dioxide (C0 2 ) concentration in our Planet's atmosphere has been rising since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. The rate of rise was gentle until the start of the 20 th Century and only accelerated from about mid-Century on, adding 70 ppm (by volume) in under 60 years to the -30 ppm that had been added in the previous two centuries.
It is also now an almost uncontested fact that the Planet's average temperature warmed by 0.6°C in the 20 th Century. This trend is not uniform and is most evident over land in the Arctic, in line with the predictions of global climate modelling.
Although a few sceptics remain, rising CO 2 concentration are now generally accepted as the major driver of the observed temperature rise. At least as a precaution, almost all countries now accept the importance of applying technology to reduce CO 2 emissions. Two new factors have recently been recognized as added causes for alarm: (1) the loss of ice mass from glaciers in Greenland south of about 70°latitude has accelerated to levels far higher than would be expected based the assumptions of modellers as a consequence of rising temperatures, raising the possibility of a seven-metre rise in sea levels from total dissolution of the Greenland ice cap within a few centuries [1] ; and (2) disruption of ocean food chains from about a 0.5 pH units of acidification of ocean surface waters [2] . These two new considerations really cannot be accommodated in the position that global society should learn to adapt to rising CO 2 levels and global warming rather than attempt to moderate the rises. . 
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"-'~5' '" 0 0 So, although the recent price rise of hydrocarbon fuels has been quite gentle by the standards of the 1970s, it is also causing many governments to consider diversification of energy sources. One notable consequence of the price rise for natural gas is that Steam-Methane Reforming (SMR) is no longer the obvious economic choice for large-scale production of hydrogen. If the world moves towards a "Hydrogen Economy", it will not necessarily be reliant on SMR but could be produced competitively from electricity from nuclear or other sustainable and non-C0 2 -emitting sources using low-temperature electrolysis. For electricity generation, wind has already gone through a period of rapid deployment -albeit strictly dependent on guarantees of premium prices and with far lower than projected capacity factors, which rarely exceed 20% (rather than projected 30 to 35%; see, for example, experience in the Gulf of St Lawrence) [3] . The difficulties of incorporating wind power into electricity grids are also now much better Evidence of energy scarcity is also beginning to appear. Figure 2 shows the price of light sweet crude oil both in historic and current dollars since 1970. The sharp rise over the last six years is attributed to expanding demand from emerging economies and a lack of major new discoveries. Oil is, of course, a global commodity. Although it has not been true historically in North America, Figure 3 shows clear evidence that natural gas prices have become linked to the price of oil in the same recent timeframe even in North America. We presume that this is a consequence of the growing interchangeability of the two fuels as well as expansion of production and shipping of liquid natural gas (LNG). 200 100 This has led to appreciation that wind -which is generally the cheapest of the renewable sources -cannot be more than a partial route to going off carbon-based fuels. With early leadership from two countries, China and India, whose energy demands are going particularly significantly, new nuclear capacity is coming back into favour in many countries and jurisdictions.
Despite improvements in energy efficiency, the World's demand for energy continues to grow. Figure 4 shows the projected trend over the 21 st Century according to the four main marker scenarios of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) [6] . While the efficiency with which energy is used varies considerably between scenarios, there is a robust link between energy use and global wealth in all scenarios. Expectations of rising standards of living for the citizens of emerging economies are driving demand for energy and the trend seems both just and almost unstoppable. Table 1 looks at energy demand in another way. It shows that energy use would rise moderately if the world's entire population used half the energy consumption of today's European or less than one quarter that of today's North American [3] . Placed in the context that a 60% reduction is considered necessary to stabilize atmospheric CO 2 levels, we conclude that conservation, while important, is not alone a realistic solution to reducing emissions of CO 2 . Massive substitution with non-emitting energy sources is also imperative.
THE IPCC MARKER SCENARIOS
The data of IPCC marker scenarios are available. We have accessed them through the MAGICC/SCENGEN package [7] , which as a surrogate for a global climate model allows one to modify the assumptions on energy usage by source (coal, oil, gas, nuclear, renewables) at five-year intervals for the entire 21 st Century.
We have modified the IPCC's assumptions in two ways. First, 80% of whatever coal consumption had been projected is replaced with nuclear or another non-C0 2 -emitting technology over the period from 2010 to 2030 and second, 80% of whatever transport consumption had been projected is replaced with the same non-C0 2 -emitting energy between 2020 and 2040. We assume that coal is predominantly used to generate electricity. Now, the IPCC figures are for hydrocarbon fuels at their input values but for nuclear and renewables as electricity. Since coal is converted to electricity with about 40% efficiency, 2.5 times as much coal will be displaced as is introduced as nuclear. Similarly, since oil-based fuels are typically used with about 15% efficiency in transport applications and the conversion of electricity to hydrogen by conventional electrolysis followed by a fuel cell to reconvert hydrogen to electricity is about 35%, a similar factor of 2.5 was applied.
81 seems to us to be the scenario of greatest interest as a possible pathway that a world intent on stopping CO 2 build-up could follow. We show our modifications to the 81 Scenario in Table 2 . For all four principal IPCC scenarios, the effects of these substitutions on atmospheric CO 2 concentrations is shown in Figure 5 and the projected effect of this on average global temperatures is shown in Figure 6 . 
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The extent to which nuclear grows in even the IPCC's original scenario (and indeed also in other IPCC scenarios) is noteworthy. Since nuclear provided 16% of the World's electricity in 2004, it is already an important component avoiding CO 2 emissions. The IPCC's 81 scenario envisages a nine-fold expansion of nuclear deployment while our double-substituted scenario envisages slightly more than a 20-fold expansion. Much of the World's existing nuclear fleet (440 units) was committed in the roughly 15 years from the late 1960s to the early 1980s. Today's unit size is larger than then and we would be contemplating about 5000 new units committed over twice as long a period. This is formidable but it is a plausible and workable solution. Table 2 shows that energy demand for Scenario 81 peaks about 2040 at rather more than twice the current usage. So the growth over the 21 st Century shown in Figure 4 will be deployed in the timeframe contemplated for our dual substitutions. Hence, most of what we are discussing is new capacity -which will have to be built anyway -not displacement of existing capacity. It is mostly a matter of building the right, non-C0 2 -emitting types of electricity generation and not a replacement of existing sources. 
HYDROGEN FOR TRANSPORTATION
In developed economies, 25 to 30% of all energy is used for transportation and the proportion is growing. No route to atmospheric CO 2 stabilization can hope to achieve the required 60% reduction in emissions without addressing transportation. To some extent, improved efficiency would help but it seems clear that gains from this approach in the developed economies will be offset by rapid expansion of transportation in emerging economies. Nonetheless, hybrid vehicles are a development that both improves efficiency and points in what is probably the right direction: electric propulsion. Ideally, electricity would be used to displace hydrocarbons for transportation but to do so requires batteries that are (1) lighter; (2) longer-lasting; (3) cheaper; and (4) faster to recharge. Despite much effort and some progress, batteries as a primary energy supply to transportation remain only a small niche where total energy requirements are low and the range is small. This may change but the obvious way ahead would seem to depend on deployment of hydrogen as a fuel [8] .
Many people have pointed out that civilization's energy supplies have evolved toward increasingly hydrogen-rich sources, progressing from coal to oil to natural gas. It is less widely appreciated that this progression continues as more and more hydrogen is added to petroleum driving a relentless expansion of hydrogen production of around 9 to 10 percent per annum. While some of this hydrogen is needed to offset the exploitation of heavier, hydrogen-lean crude oil, it is also being added to enhance the characteristics of transport fuels. In that sense, we have already begun to move toward a Hydrogen Age. The next logical step beyond that will be to focus on the parts of the transportation sector where it will most easily and advantageously introduced. In an earlier paper, one of us [9] noted that trains, ships and planes all have obvious attractions. We continue to believe that these are more probable transport sectors than private vehicles for early adoption of hydrogen as a fuel.
Sources of Hydrogen Production
In an earlier paper, we showed how hydrogen could be produced at a competitive price by conventional water electrolysis if electricity production were divided between sales to the grid at times when demand and price were high and production of hydrogen. With the recent rise in the price of oil and natural gas, the economics of electrolytic hydrogen have further improved.
Both of the above papers show how substantial amounts of energy supplied by wind turbines could be incorporated alongside nuclear-produced electricity if electrolysis cells were used with a capacity to handle about a 40% variation in current density. The concept of converting wind-generated electricity into hydrogen is often proposed as a way to overcome wind's unpredictability and intermittency but, on its own, it would have high capital cost because of severe underutilization -exacerbated by any diversion of electricity to the grid at times of peak price. Provided wind turbines can achieve their projected level of output of around one-third of nameplate capacity, our NuWind© concept to harness the nuclear and wind ,~:
"' ---- + -------. . -----: 7 ' " " " -/ " _ -------" ---: Hydrogen is valued at 2850 US$/tonne so that 100% conversion of hydrogen to electricity would yield the same net revenue as selling electricity at 4.5 ¢US/kW.h. The 2850 US$/tonne value assigned to hydrogen is a rounding up of our estimate of the likely cost of producing hydrogen by SMR. The value assigned to the electricity is our best estimate of the cost of production by new nuclear in Alberta. It is less than the 5.77 ¢US/kW.h actually averaged for the prices actually paid by the Alberta Pool in those 14 months but the Alberta Pool price has been very variable and this is the highest level yet attained.
Both with and without wind, co-production of electricity and hydrogen is more profitable than selling electricity alone.
CONCLUSIONS
With the price of natural gas broadly in-line with the price of oil and the cost of CO 2 sequestration included, hydrogen produced by intermittent electrolysis has become competitive where the electricity is produced by nuclear power or a combination of nuclear power and wind. Combined with a broad switch in production of electricity away from coal to sources not emitting CO 2 , one can envisage CO 2 emissions falling to a level at which atmospheric CO 2 levels would be stabilized later in the 21 5t Century for the IPCC's B1 Scenario.
Achieving this vision requires about a twenty-fold increase in nuclear deployment worldwide (rather than the six-fold envisaged in the IPCCs B1 scenario). Though the challenge to delivering nuclear on this scale should not be belittled, the requirement for reactor deployment is approximately five times what was achieved in the 1970s. Further, the requirement is predominantly for new electricity-generation capacity in developing countries. So the issue is not of whether the capacity has to be built but of choosing to build it with technology that is appropriate for near-zero-C0 2 emissions, high capacity factor, and lowest overall cost.
Because nuclear reactor economics strongly favour continuous operation, increased reliance on nuclear generation would be complemented by directing off-peak generation to new applications in the transportation sector, either as hydrogen or battery-stored electricity. This is in itself advantageous since the CO 2 emissions from the transport sector must be sharply curtailed.
